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Abstract 
 
The French theory of Laïcité, or assertive secularism, has rapidly 
developed to become a significant part of the French constitutional legacy, 
which subsequently brought out what should have been expected:  conflicts 
between the right to self-determination, local culture, religious freedom, 
and the state interest in curbing radicalism and extremism.1  This article 
analyzes these conflicts based on the decision of the Conseil d'État, which 
lifted the French ban on the burkini on August 26, 2016.2  This article 
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1. Susanne Baer, A Closer Look at Law:  Human Rights as Multi-Level Sites of Struggles 
Over Multi-Dimensional Equality, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 56, 57 (2010).  
2. Association de Defense des Droits de l’Homme Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en 
France, LE CONSEIL D’ÉTAT ET LA JURIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www. 
conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Selection-des-decisions-faisant-l-objet-d-
uncommunication-particuliere/CE-ordonnance-du-26-aout-2016-Ligue-des-droits-de-l-homme-etautre 
sassociation-de-defense-des-droits-de-l-homme-collectif-contre-l-islamophobie-en-France [hereinafter 
Droits de l’Homme Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie]. 
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discusses the two opposite ways one could read the decision:  some could 
see it as shielding fundamental rights and freedoms, while others could see 
it as an obstacle in the way of protecting France against Islamic extremism.3  
In doing so, the article aims to provide a critical analysis of the significance 
of the Laïcité policy on individual freedom and religious liberty by 
following the Conseil d'État, and the European Court of Human Rights, in 
regards to their ban of religious symbols and attires in France and different 
comparative jurisdictions.4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2009, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy addressed the 
French Parliament and stated that a burqa—an Islamic attire worn by 
Muslim women that covers the entire body, including a mesh over the face 
with an opening for the eyes—never creates a religious problem, instead it 
poses a serious problem to the freedom and dignity of women, since it is 
not a religious symbol but a sign of servitude and degradation.5  “Thus, a 
burqa is not welcomed on the French territory.”6  
Two months later, in August 2009, pursuant to President Sarkozy's 
speech, a Muslim French woman was banned by French officials from 
swimming in a public pool while wearing a burkini, a swimsuit that covered 
her entire body.7  Following what President Sarkozy said in his speech, the 
French officials avoided raising any religious worries, instead citing 
hygiene concerns as a reason for the ban.8 
Despite the fact that we were told that the 2009 burkini ban from 
swimming pools was not driven by any religious motives, in August 
2016—following the recent terrorist attacks in France—the mayor of 
Cannes, David Lisnard, banned wearing burkinis on Cannes's beaches, 
citing a possible link to Islamic extremism.9  Further, the mayor of 
Villeneuve-Loubet proceeded to implement the provisions of the Decree of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. See generally Baer, supra note 1.  
4. See generally Baer, supra note 1; see also S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2014); CE Sect., June 27, 2008, Rec. Lebon 286798 [hereinafter Rec. Lebon 286798]. 
5. Nicolas Sarkozy, La burqa n’est pas la bienvenue sur le territoire de la République, 
LIBÉRATION (June 22, 2009), http://www.liberation.fr/france/2009/06/22/sarkozy-la-burqa-n-est-pas-la-
bienvenue-sur-le-territoire-de-la-republique_566253. 
6. Id. 
7. Mayor Alain Kelyor, French Pool Bans ‘Burkini’ Swim, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8197917.stm (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
8. Id. 
9. David Lisnard, Mayor of Cannes Bans Burkinis on Resort’s Beaches, THEGUARDIAN 
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/cannes-mayor-bansburqinisbeach 
wear-must-respect-secularism.   
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August 5, 2016, which was conceded by the State to the town.10  Article 4.3 
of the Decree reads:   
Of all the common beach areas, access to swimming is prohibited 
to anyone that does not have a dress, respectful of morality and 
the principle of secularism, and compliance with hygiene and 
safety rules adapted in swimming maritime public domain.  
Wearing clothes, while swimming, having a connotation contrary 
to the principles mentioned above is strictly prohibited on the 
beaches of the town.11  
This provision was interpreted by the authorities to address the 
necessity of prohibiting wearing burkinis on the town's beaches.12  
One cannot argue that President Sarkozy's approach was cunning in 
refraining from describing a burqa as a religious symbol.13  In fact, the 
mayor of Cannes, as well as the State’s Decree of August 5, 2016, were so 
naive in linking wearing burkinis with religious agendas or extremism.14  
Indeed, any attempt to ban the wearing of a certain dress, which is most 
often worn by people following a certain religion, would inevitably result in 
a conflict between a number of concepts that seem to already be contested, 
such as, freedom of religion, equality, secularism, democracy, and self-
determination.15  Interestingly, any attempt to reconcile these conflicts 
brings out more paradoxical situations. 
First, when religion is given priority it is likely that secularism and 
democracy will be at stake.16  The decision of whether the Jewish character 
of the state should be given preference over the democratic nature of the 
state or vice versa is something that Israel's Supreme Court found itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Another French Riviera Town Bans Burkinis from Its Beaches, RFI:  WORLD & ALL ITS 
VOICES (Aug. 13, 2016), http://en.rfi.fr/france/20160813-another-french-riviera-town-bans-burkinis-its-
beaches; see also Ed Vulliamy, ‘They Want Us to Be Invisible’:  How The Ban on Burkinis Is Dividing 
the Côte d’Azur, THEGUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 
aug/20/burkini-ban-cote-d-azur-spreads-france-divide. 
11. This law would later be challenged before the French administrative courts and suspended 
by the Conseil d'État, France's highest administrative court, as it will be discussed later.  Philippe 
Cossalter, The French Burkini Case:  “Uncover this Breast that I Cannot Behold”, REVUE GÉNÉRALE 
DU DROIT § 2, (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2016/09/05/the-french-burkini-
case-uncover-this-breast-that-i-cannot-not-behold/. 
12. Id. 
13. Sarkozy, supra note 5. 
14. See generally Lisnard, supra note 9; Cossalter, supra note 11. 
15. Baer, supra note 1. 
16. Id. 
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troubled with.17  The Israeli Supreme Court’s apparent confusion regarding 
this decision could simply be attributed to the fact that Israel's constitutional 
identity is based on two main canons:  a) the Jewish nature of the state, as 
mentioned in the Declaration of Independence of 1948,18 and b) the 
democratic character of the state as added by the Ninth Amendment to the 
Basic Law, the Knesset of 1985.19  With that being said, one of the big 
challenges faced by the Israel Supreme Court was how to build a judicial 
ideology that would demonstrate its commitment to define Israel both as a 
Jewish state and as a democratic one.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17. JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC STATE, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_and_democratic 
state (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
18.  
On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a 
Resolution for the establishment of an independent Jewish State in Palestine, and 
called upon the inhabitants of the country to take such steps as may be necessary 
on their part to put the plan into effect . . . HEREBY PROCLAIM the 
establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called ISRAEL. 
Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel, 5708‒1948 (Members of the People’s Council, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-declaration-of-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel (Isr.).  
19. Article 7(A) of the Ninth Amendment provides “A candidates list shall not participate in 
elections to the Knesset, if the goals or actions of the list, expressly or by implication, include one of the 
following:  (1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state . . . .”  
See generally Knesset Election (Prevention of Participation of Candidates’ List), 5718–1958, (Isr.). 
20. RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS:  THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60 (Oxford U. Press, 2014); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY:  THE 
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 174 (Harv. U. Press, 2007); see also 
HCJ 359/66 Meatrael v. The Council of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel 48(5) IsrSC 617, (1980) (Isr.).;  
The difficulty of the commitment assigned to the Israeli Supreme Court was evident when it found itself 
obligated to interpret the Basic Law:  Human Dignity and Liberty of 1992, and the Basic Law:  Freedom 
of Occupation of 1992 and 1994, protecting the right of every citizen or resident of the state to engage in 
any occupation, profession, or business, as well as the right to property, due process of law, freedom of 
movement, life, personal freedom, privacy, and human dignity.  The Court interpreted the two Basic 
Laws in one of its famous decisions, the Meatrael's case in 1994.  The case involved Meatrael, a private 
company that imports non-Kosher meat products into Israel, that appealed to the Supreme Court against 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs' refusal to license the company to import non-Kosher meat.  The 
company argued that the Ministry's decision violated its constitutional rights to freedom of occupation 
and business, which are both granted in Israel's Basic Law:  Freedom of Occupation, and its rights to 
privacy, personal freedom, and property, which are granted in Israel's Basic Law:  Human Dignity and 
Liberty.  On the other hand, the Ministry of Religious Affairs defended its decision on the basis that 
allowing the company to continue importing non-Kosher meat would hurt Israel's Jewish character, 
which should be regarded as a fundamental constitutional norm.  At first, the Court was convinced that 
freedom of occupation is an enshrined constitutional principle that should not be restricted by refusing 
to uphold the Ministry's decision to terminate the license of the private company.  However, under 
painstaking pressures from the Ministry of Religious Affairs along with the religious parties, the Basic 
Code:  Freedom of Occupation was amended allowing further amendments by ordinary laws enacted by 
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Second, the principle of equality may also be at stake when certain 
religious norms are given priority.  To the extent that some liberals see 
forcing women to wear a hijab, niqab, or burqa in some Muslim countries 
as disturbing the principle of equality, other conservative Muslims see the 
ban imposed by some western countries on wearing such Islamic attires, 
including burkinis, as an attack on the principle of equality.21  As Susanne 
Baer once stated, in the conflict between religion versus democracy and 
secularism, “sex equality, or feminism, is . . . on the agenda very 
prominently.”22 
Third, when the principle of self-determination is found to be on one 
side and religion and secularism on the other, they do not coexist.  For 
instance, apart from any religious considerations, Muslim women in France 
could see wearing a burkini as something that is related to self-
determination and autonomy, regardless of what France may think about 
how its strict theory on secularism should be applied.23 
In Part I of this article I intend to introduce and illustrate the French 
law on the issue of secularism and public order and how it relates to the 
burkini ban.  In doing so, I will trace the decisions of the French Conseil 
d'État on the ban on wearing Islamic hijabs in public schools and burkinis 
on beaches.  Further, I will shed light on the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (ECHR) position on banning religious symbols in the public sphere, 
in an attempt to determine what the opinion of the ECHR would be if a 
hypothetical burkini ban case were to be presented before the French 
Courts. 
In Part II of this article I will survey a wide range of comparative 
models regarding the position of the world's constitutions on religion.  
Herein, I will highlight:  a) the positions of France and Turkey, that regard 
secularism as a core value of democracy; b) the doctrine of religious 
neutrality introduced by the United States Constitution; and c) the strong 
religious establishment clause adopted by the Iranian Constitution.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Knesset.  Subsequently, the Knesset passed a law that prohibits the importation of non-Kosher 
products into Israel:  “the Meat Law of 1994.”  Based on this law, the Ministry terminated the license to 
import non-Kosher meat.  Meatrael appealed the decision to the Supreme Court for the second time; 
however, the Court overturned its previous precedent holding based on the new Meat Law and the 
recent amendments to the Basic Law.  In fact, this decision was seen as a response from the Court to the 
political pressure to realize the Jewish character of Israel. HCJ 359/66 Meatrael v. The Council of the 
Chief Rabbinate of Israel, 48(5) 617, (1980) (Isr.).  
21. Id. 
22. Baer, supra note 1, at 57. 
23. Id. at 57; see also Huda Jawad, The Burkini Ban is Misogynistic—and Western Feminists 
Are Turning a Blind Eye, INDEPENDENT, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/burkini-cannes-
islamophobia-banning-the-burkini-is-misogynistic-and-western-feminists-are-turning-a-a7188806.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
[Vol. 23:3     ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 448  
 
In doing so, I intend to examine the burkini ban in each of these 
constitutional models.  Finally, I will end with some closing remarks. 
II. THE LAW IN FRANCE 
A. The Burqa and Hijab Affair 
In France, the approach governing the relationship between state and 
religion revolves around the theory of “Laïcité”, otherwise known in 
English as “Assertive Secularism.”24  This theory—stemming from the first 
article of the French Constitution of 1958, which states:  “France shall be an 
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic”—simply means that 
bringing one's religion into the “public sphere” is prohibited.25 
Laïcité was created as an attempt to free the state from the influence of 
religious clerics and guilds, and to establish a religion-free citizenship and 
national identity.26  The policy did not only free France politically and 
socially from the influence of religion, but rather it continued to grow until 
it introduced itself as a supra-constitutional value, which established what is 
now known as assertive secularism or militant secularism.27 
A careful examination of the French Conseil d'État’s decisions reveals 
ample evidence that is pertinent to the notion of the laïcité policy, and the 
case of Faiza Silmi is an example of this.28  Faiza Silmi was born in 
Morocco, married a French citizen of Moroccan origin, and permanently 
moved to France in 2000, where she had three children.29  She applied for 
citizenship of France in 2004, however, her application was denied in 
2005.30 The government denied her application citing her radical beliefs and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24. Ran Hirschl, Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN COMPARATIVE LAW 422, 435 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Rosalind Dixon ed., 2011). 
25. ROAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 104 
(Oxford U. Press, 2010). 
26. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 73 (Oxford U. 
Press, 2005); see also Hirschl, supra note 24. 
27. Hirschl, supra note 24. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Article 21-2 of the French Civil Code of 1804 provides  
An alien or stateless person who marries and whose spouse is of French 
nationality may, after a period of two years from the marriage, acquire French 
nationality by way of declaration provided that, at the time of the declaration, the 
community of living, both affective and physical, has not come to an end and the 
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actions, which included amongst other things:  wearing the Islamic niqab 
since she arrived in France, leaving her house only when her husband 
joined her, and being in a complete submission to men.31  According to the 
French government, Silmi's beliefs and actions were inconsistent with the 
values of French society and the principle of equality between the two 
sexes.32  Silmi appealed the government's decision to the Conseil d'État.33 
Relying on the information provided by the government, the Conseil 
upheld the decision to deny Silmi's application for citizenship.34  The 
Conseil reasoned that the applicant “adopted a radical practice of her 
religion, incompatible with the essential values of the French community . . 
. .”35  The Conseil argued that the applicant's beliefs failed to assimilate into 
the French culture, as mentioned in Article 21-4 of the French Civil Code,36 
which allows the government to deny a citizenship application of a foreign 
spouse for lack of assimilation on grounds other than linguistics.37 
Likewise, the controversy surrounding the wearing of Islamic 
headgear—hijab—in public contributed to the development of the scope of 
the laïcité policy, particularly the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat.  For 
instance, on November 27, 1989, pursuant to the Minister of Education’s 
request for a decision on the issue of whether school principals could expel 
students who wear religious attire, the General Assembly of the Conseil 
rendered its legal opinion: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
French spouse has kept his or her nationality.  The foreign spouse must also prove 
a sufficient knowledge of the French language, according to his or her condition.  
The article would later be amended to allow “Foreigners or stateless persons who contracts 
marriage with a French citizen spouse may, after a period of four years from the marriage, acquire 
French nationality.”  Id.; see also C. CIV. art. 21‒2 (Fr.). 
31. Hirschl, supra note 24. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.; see also Rec. Lebon 286798, supra note 4. 
36. Hirschl, supra note 24; see also C. CIV. art. 21‒4 (Fr.). 
37.  
By a decree in Conseil d'Etat, the Government may, on grounds of indignity or 
lack of assimilation other than linguistic (Act no 2003-1119 of 26 Nov. 2003), 
oppose the acquisition of French nationality by the foreign spouse within a period 
of one year after the date of the acknowledgement of receipt provided for in 
Article 26, paragraph 2, or, where the registration was refused, after the day when 
the judgment which admits the lawfulness of the declaration has entered into 
force. 
C. CIV. art. 21‒4 (Fr.).  
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It results from the above that, in teaching establishments, the 
wearing by students of symbols by which they intend to manifest 
their religious affiliation is not by itself incompatible with the 
principle of laïcité, as it constitutes the free exercise of freedom 
of expression and of manifestation of religious creeds, but that 
this freedom should not allow students to sport signs of religious 
affiliation that, due to their nature, or the conditions in which 
they are worn individually or collectively, or due to their 
ostentatious and provocative character, would constitute an act of 
pressure, provocation, proselytism, or would harm the dignity or 
the freedom of the student or other members of the educative 
community, or would compromise their health or safety, or 
would perturb the educational activities or the education role of 
the teaching personnel, or would trouble public order in the 
establishment or the normal functioning of the public service.38 
Moreover, in a claim concerning the annulment of a decision by the 
board of governors of the secondary school Jean Jaurès at Montfermeil on 
September 28, 1990—which prohibited wearing an “Islamic headscarf”—
the Conseil, quoting its previous legal opinion, ruled that "strictly banning 
the wearing of any distinctive sign, clothing or other religious, political or 
philosophical” attire constitutes a general and absolute prohibition which is 
in breach of the principle of laïcité.39  Likewise, on March 14, 1994, the 
Conseil rendered its opinion on the validity of a public school regulation, 
which stipulates that “no pupil shall be admitted to the classroom, study or 
refectory with their head covered.”40  The Conseil declared that such a rule 
infringes the principles inherited in the French society, in particular the 
principles of freedom of expression, neutrality, and secularism (laïcité).41 
In what may appear as a stark deviation from its previous position, in 
1995 the Conseil delivered a decision that highly disturbed the relation 
between the principle of laïcité and its previous rulings on wearing 
religious symbols and garbs.42  Specifically, on March 10, 1995, the Conseil 
presided over a case regarding the expulsion of three Muslim students from 
a high school for wearing hijabs, which violated the school's policy against 
the establishment of proselytism.43  Contrary to its previous holdings, the 
Conseil upheld the expulsion, stating that the ruling was justified because 
“wearing this headscarf is incompatible with the proper conduct of physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38. CE Ass., Nov. 27, 1989, 346.893 [hereinafter CE Ass. 346.893]. 
39. CE Sect., Nov. 2, 1992, Rec. Lebon 130394. 
40. CE Sect., Mar. 14, 1994, Rec. Lebon 145656. 
41. Id. 
42. See generally CE Sect., Mar. 10, 1995, Rec. Lebon 159981. 
43. Id. 
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education classes; that the decision definitively excluding these two pupils 
was taken on account of the unrest caused by their refusal in the life of the 
establishment . . . .”44  However, on November 27, 1996, the Conseil 
seemed to adhere again to its lenient approach on the interpretation of the 
principle of laïcité when it struck down the decision of the Lille 
Administrative Court, which had upheld decisions by high schools to expel 
Muslim students who wore hijabs.45  The Conseil reasoned that although 
“pupils in question intended to express their religious beliefs cannot be 
regarded as a sign which, by its nature, is ostentatious or demanding, and 
which would in any case be an act of pressure or Proselytism.”46 
On the legislative level, a law that highly reflects the laïcité policy is 
Law 2004-228 concerning the ban of religious symbols and garbs in public 
schools.47  Despite the fact that the law does not expressly state an intention 
to impose a ban on a certain emblem or attire of a particular religion—
being that the law bans the wearing of all Islamic, Christian, Jewish 
symbols and garb in public schools—48 many people felt, however, that the 
main purpose of the law was to ban the Islamic headscarf (hijab) in public 
schools.49 
The French Stasi Commission, established by former President 
Jacques Chirac and named after its commissioner and Mediator of the 
Republic Bernard Stasi to oversee the application of the laïcité policy in the 
French territory, has taken upon itself the task of defending the law against 
its critics.50  On December 11, 2003, the Commission published a report in 
which it expressed considerable fears that wearing religious attires and 
displaying religious symbols in public schools would constitute a stark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Id. 
45. CE Sect., Nov. 27, 1996, Rec. Lebon 170208. 
46. Id. 
47. Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de 
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics.  
[Law No. 2004–228 of March 15, 2004, concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation 
of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary 
and secondary schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004 [hereinafter Loi 2004-228]. 
48. The first Article of the Law reads, “It is inserted in the Education Code, Article L. 141-5 
after article L. 141-5-1,” which reads as follows:  “Art. L. 141-5-1. – In schools, colleges and public 
high schools, the wearing of signs or clothes by which pupils overtly manifest a religious affiliation is 
prohibited.  The rules shall state that the implementation of a disciplinary procedure is preceded by 
dialogue with the pupil.”  Loi 2004-228, supra note 47. 
49. Id. 
50. See generally COMMISSION DE REFLEXION SUR L’APPLICATION DU PRINCIPLE DE 
LAÏCITE DANS LA REPUBLIQUE, RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE (2003) [hereinafter 
Rapport Au President De La Republique]. 
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violation of the policy of laïcité, which was translated by the report as the 
principle of secularity in France.51 
However, it is worth mentioning that the report paid significant 
attention to the wearing of the Islamic headscarf—hijab—in public schools, 
arguing that “to those who wear the veil—Islamic hijab—, it can have 
different meanings.”52  “It may be a personal choice or rather a constraint, 
particularly intolerable for the young girls.”53  Further, the report identified 
that some people regard wearing a Muslim hijab as a manifestation of “the 
pubescent girl or woman as solely responsible for the desire of ‘man’, a 
vision that fundamentally violates the principle of equality between men 
and women.”54  Eventually, the report recommended that a law should be 
enacted to meet the demand of a ban on wearing any visible religious signs 
in France:  Law 2004-228 was the outcome of this recommendation.55 
Another instructive example of the laïcité policy could be found in 
France's ban on the Islamic burqa.  On September 14, 2010, motivated by 
President Sarkozy's speech in June 2009, the French National Assembly 
passed a bill by a vote of 335–1, which banned people from wearing face-
covering headgear, including burqas, niqabs, and other attires in public.56  
For those who violate the ban, the law sets forth a sanction consisting of a 
fine up to €150, and/or a requirement to complete a citizenship education 
course.57 
Upon taking all of the steps necessary to finalize the law, the Conseil 
d'État was called to give its opinion on it.58  In a report titled “Study on the 
practice of wearing the Full Veil,” the Conseil emphasized that the practice 
of wearing a full body veil that hides the face is prohibited in two 
situations:  “(1) for public officials in the course of their functions; and (2) 
integral veils in public schools, [worn] in the name of the principle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 57. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Rapport Au President De La Republique, supra note 50, at 58; see generally Loi 2004-
228, supra note 47. 
56. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace 
public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Act Prohibiting Concealment of the Face in Public Space], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 
2010. 
57. Id. 
58. Étude Relative Aux Possibilités Juridiques d’Interdiction du Port du Voile Intégral, LE 
CONSEIL D’ÉTAT ET LA JURIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ 
Decisions-Avis-Publications/Etudes-Publications/Rapports-Etudes/Etude-relative-aux-possibilitesjuridi 
ques-d-interdiction-du-port-du-voile-integral [hereinafter Interdiction du Port du Voile Intégral]. 
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secularism.”59  Further, the Conseil argued that the general ban on face 
coverings could be justified on “public safety considerations and the fight 
against fraud.”60  More precisely, the Conseil allowed the ban, “for 
purposes of identity checks and the performance of certain official 
procedures such as, marriage and voting" since in these situations a 
woman's refusal to uncover her face constitutes a “denial of access or 
delivery of these services.”61 
However, the Conseil came to the conclusion that a general prohibition 
on wearing a full veil or any mode of face covering in public would expose 
serious risks under the constitution and the safety of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.62  Thus, 
according to the Conseil, a general ban on full veils or any kind of attire 
that conceals the face would confer “considerable legal uncertainty.”63  
Despite the Conseil's condemnation towards the ban on burqas, the 
Constitutional Council of France cleared all legal obstacles surrounding the 
Law of 2010-1192—banning the concealment of one’s face in public—
when it confirmed its constitutionality in October 2010, ordering its 
publication in the Official Journal of the French Republic.64 
B. The Burkini Affair 
As mentioned above, the French ban on burkinis started to take its 
legislative form in 2016, when the town of Villeneuve-Loubet applied the 
provisions of the Decree of August 5, 2016, whereby Article 4.3 explains 
that the wearing of the burkini is declared to be against the principle of 
secularism, hygiene, and safety rules.65  Since the implementation of the 
Decree of August 5, 2016, as well as the ban of the burkini on Cannes’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Interdiction du Port du Voile Intégral, supra note 58. 
64. Constitutional Council, Decision n° 2010-613 DC of October 7th 2010.  In confirming the 
constitutionality of the law, the Constitutional Council argued that French Parliament "has felt that such 
practices (covering faces) are dangerous for public safety and security and fail to comply with the 
minimum requirements of life in society.  It also felt that those women who conceal their face, 
voluntarily or otherwise, are placed in a situation of exclusion and inferiority patently incompatible with 
constitutional principles of liberty and equality."  Nicolas Boring, Global Legal Monitor, LIBR. 
CONGRESS (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-2010-law-banning-full-
islamic-veil-challenged-in-court/. 
65. Cossalter, supra note 11. 
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beaches, a wide public and political outcry rapidly grew over the apparent 
public humiliation and ostracism of Muslim women.66 
The public and political outcry was translated in a legal claim filed by 
the League of Human Rights (LDH) and the Committee against 
Islamophobia in France (CCIF), before the Nice Administrative Court 
asking for the suspension of the Decree of August 5, 2016, based on Article 
L. 521-2 of the Administrative Code of Justice.67  In its decision, the Court 
dismissed the petitioners’ claim, refusing their arguments that the Decree 
violated a pack of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression.68  The Court reasoned that, pursuant to 
the July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice, the ban on wearing burkinis seemed 
“necessary, appropriate and proportionate” to eliminate extremism and 
retain public order.69  Further, the Court found the ban on burkinis to be 
consistent with French law regarding prohibiting actions that neglect the 
“relations between public authorities and private individuals on the basis of 
religion.”70  The decision was appealed to the French Conseil d'État.71 
On appeal, the Conseil satisfied its jurisdiction requirement by 
reasoning that the urgency requirement of Article L. 521-2 of the 
Administrative Code of Justice, which allows a court to “order any measure 
necessary to safeguard a fundamental freedom” that was illegally infringed 
by the administrative authority, was fulfilled.72  In deciding the subject of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66. Alissa J. Rubin, French ‘Burkini’ Bans Provoke Backlash as Armed Police Confront 
Beachgoers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/france-
burkini.html?_r=0. 
67.  
On an application justified by a sense of urgency, the judge may take any 
measures necessary to safeguard the fundamental freedom to which a legal person 
of public law or private law body responsible for the management of a public 
service would have worn in the exercise of its powers, a serious and manifestly 
illegal infringement.  The judge will rule within forty-eight hours. 
 Loi 2000-597 du 30 Juin 2000 relative au référé devant les juridictions administratives 
[Law 2000-597 of June 30, 2000 on the Relating to Summary Proceedings Before the Administrative 
Courts], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
Feb. 13, 2017. 
68. Id. 
69. Ben Quinn, French Police Make Woman Remove Clothing on Nice Beach Following 
Burkini Ban, THEGUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-
police-make-woman-remove-burkini-on-nice-beach. 
70. Michael Curtis, France Addresses Muslim Women, ENG. REV. (Aug. 16, 2016), 
http://www.newenglishreview.org/blog_direct_link.cfm/blog_id/64918/cat_id/1403/France-Addresses-
Muslim-Women. 
71. Droits de l’Homme Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie, supra note 2. 
72. Id. 
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the appeal, the Conseil acknowledged that, “under Article L. 2212-1 of the 
General Code of Local and Regional Authorities, the mayor is responsible, 
under the administrative control of the State Representative, for the 
municipal police,” and that the municipal police, as set out in Article 
L.2212-2, “aims to ensure public order, safety, security and health.”73  
However, the Conseil emphasized that although the mayor is charged with 
policing the municipality, “he must reconcile the accomplishment of his 
mission with respect for the freedoms guaranteed by law.”74 
In examining the public order concerns which were raised by the 
mayor of the town of Villeneuve-Loubet as justification for the ban on the 
burkini, the Conseil, in an interesting analysis, stated that the apparent 
purpose of the Decree of August 5, 2016 is to set forth requirements 
concerning “the right access to the shore, safe bathing and hygiene, and 
decency on the beach.”75  Consequently, the Conseil concluded that mayors 
do not have the authority to deviate from this purpose in order to justify 
their actions on other considerations that are likely to restrict individual 
freedoms by proven risks of harm to public order.76 
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT’S DECISIONS  
A careful examination of the previous decisions of the Conseil d'État 
reveals that it set out a group of legal principles—related to secular public 
life and education, and freedom of religion and expression—that define the 
limits of the relationship between the principle of laïcité and the wearing of 
religious symbols and attires as an expression of individual freedom.77 
First, in the headscarf cases, the Conseil established a prominent legal 
principle that wearing an Islamic headscarf, per se, is not against the 
principle of secularism.78  Through this principle, the Conseil intentionally 
sought to ensure the importance of acknowledging certain individual 
freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
manifesting one's religion.79  This approach was evident in the Conseil's 
aforementioned decision of 1989 where it declared that wearing a headscarf 
is “not by itself incompatible with the principle of secularism, insofar as it 
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76. Droits de l’Homme Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie, supra note 2. 
77. See generally id. 
78. Fatima Osman, Legislative Prohibitions on Wearing a Headscarf:  Are They Justified?, 17 
POTCHEFSTROOM L.J. 1, 49 (2014). 
79. Id. 
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constitutes the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of 
manifestation of religious beliefs.”80 
Second, in the same decision, the Conseil tried to limit the scope of the 
principle that wearing a headscarf is “not by itself incompatible with the 
principle of secularism” by emphasizing that religious symbols (the 
headscarf in this case) could be considered against the principle of 
secularism if by its nature, or by the conditions in which its worn, or by its 
ostentatious character it constitutes “an act of pressure, provocation, 
proselytism or propaganda,” or it degrades the human dignity of the 
students and employees of the educational institutions, or it endangers their 
health and safety, or it disturbs the educational system or the public 
service.81  However, the Conseil refrained from determining whether the 
nature of a religious symbol, or the conditions in which it is worn, or its 
ostentatious character violates the principle of secularism.82  With that 
being said, it seems like the Conseil intended to evaluate how the wearing 
of a religious symbol would be against secularism on a case by case basis 
rather than establishing a legal precedent with a binding effect settling this 
issue.83 
Third, the Conseil affirmed its theory in the niqab and burqa cases.84  
For instance, in the Case of Faiza Silmi, the Conseil upheld the 
government's decision denying her of French citizenship, not because of the 
fact that she wore the niqab, per se, but because of the conditions in which 
the niqab was worn.85  For example, Silmi started wearing the niqab once 
she arrived in France, which led her not to leave her house without her 
husband and to be in complete submission to men, which according to the 
Conseil constituted a breach to the French secularity.86  Likewise, in its 
comment on the Law of 2010-1192 regarding the prohibition of concealed 
faces in public, the Conseil welcomed the ban on wearing a burqa and a 
niqab for security reasons if uncovering the woman’s face is necessary for 
an identity check.87  Nevertheless, the Conseil refused to impose a general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80. CE Ass. 346.893, supra note 38. 
81. Nicky Jones, Religious Freedom in a Secular Society:  The Case of the Islamic Headscarf 
in France, MACQUARIE L.J. 1, 3‒4 (2009). 
82. Id. 
83. Nicky Jones, Beneath the Veil:  Muslim Girls and Islamic Headscarves in Secular France, 
9 MACQUARIE L.J. 47, 53 (2009). 
84. Hirschl, supra note 24. 
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87. Interdiction du Port du Voile Intégral, supra note 58. 
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ban on wearing burqas and niqabs since it would impose an undue 
restriction on fundamental freedoms.88 
Fourth, in overturning the ban on wearing burkinis, the Conseil 
applied its lenient theory, that wearing certain symbols that reflect ones 
religious affiliation is not against the principle of secularism, when it 
refused the argument of the Villeneuve-Loubet mayor that the wearing of 
the burkini shows a sign of Islamic extremism and disturbs the public 
order.89  Interestingly, in reaching this opinion, the Conseil adopted a 
pragmatic approach in interpreting Article L. 2212-2 of the General Code of 
Local and Regional Authorities by limiting its scope on the mayor’s power 
to ensure public order, safety, and health without the confiscation of 
fundamental freedoms.90 
Fifth, the previous decisions of the French Conseil d'État could 
arguably function as an indication that the Conseil is of the opinion that 
nothing is wrong with women just wearing a hijab, niqab, burqa, or a 
burkini as long as their intention is to just wear these religious symbols.91  
In fact, one could see the Conseil's approach as a violation of the French 
policy of laïcité, which necessitates the eclipse of religion in the public 
sphere.92  However, it seems like the Conseil decided to give preference to 
fundamental freedoms, when women do nothing more than wear religious 
symbols, without completely overruling the laïcité policy, since the ban on 
such symbols will be sustained if the purpose of wearing it is to be used as 
an act of pressure, or to advance proselytism or propaganda, or to 
undermine human dignity, or to disturb the order of the good function of the 
public service.93 
IV. THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
After the French Parliament passed the Law of 2010-1192—the Act 
Prohibiting Concealment of the Face in Public Space—on September 14, 
2010, and after the constitutionality of the law was confirmed by the French 
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89. In one of its famous decision, the Conseil argued that the concept of public policy may 
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Constitutional Council on October 7, 2010, and despite the concerns 
expressed about the law by the Conseil d'État in its report, a claim was 
lodged against the French Republic challenging the law for being 
inconsistent with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).94 
The plaintiff, a French national, claimed that the law violates the 
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.95  Precisely, the plaintiff 
identified that Article 3 (prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment), Article 
8 (protecting privacy and family life), Article 9 (protecting freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion), Article 10 (protecting freedom of 
expression), Article 11 (protecting freedom of assembly and association), 
and Article 14 (prohibiting discrimination) of the Convention are 
inconsistent with French law.96 
After spending considerable time examining a wide range of 
legislative history that was related to the case, the ECHR found that there 
was no violation of Article 3 or Article 14 of the Convention since the 
Court's standard for “the minimum level of severity required for ill-
treatment” was not satisfied.97  Thus, the complaint under these two cases 
does not meet the standard of admissibility set forth in Article 35 § 3(a) of 
the Convention.98  Likewise, the Court dismissed the applicant's Article 11 
argument for being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 
§ 3(a) of the Convention since the applicant failed to show how the French 
law would breach her freedom of assembly and association.99 
In examining Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the Convention, the Court found 
that the ban on wearing veils and face coverings, established by the law, 
violates the requirements of the right to privacy, the right to freedom of 
expression, and the freedom of thought and religion laid down in the 
Articles.100  However, the Court emphasized—what would turn out to be its 
favored path in deciding such claims—that the mechanism of the European 
Convention on Human Rights has a “fundamentally subsidiary” role, which 
means that national authorities with “direct democratic legitimation” are in 
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98. “The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 
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a better position than an international court to evaluate and decide its local 
needs.101 
In setting the standard mentioned above, the Court examined the 
argument raised by the government that the contested law intends to 
maintain “gender equality,” “human dignity,” and “respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.”102  The Court 
was unconvinced that “gender equality” and respect for “human dignity” 
would justify an absolute ban on a full face veil.103  Nevertheless, the Court 
seemed convinced that the full face veil may constitute a violation of 
respect on the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.104  
The Court reasoned that the concealment of one's face is incompatible with 
the “requirements of living together” in a French society,105 and that it 
violates the notions of fraternity and civility inherited in society since it 
inhibits social interaction.106  Thus, according to the Court, the French law 
is valid and must stand.107 
This decision summarizes the Court's philosophy that local authorities 
are in a better position to determine what is best for preserving and 
maintaining their constitutional norms and social values, and thus they 
should be empowered with wide discretion in making such 
determination.108  More precisely, the Court delegated the task of 
determining what is best for the application of Laïcité to the French 
authorities by declaring the mechanism of the European Convention on 
Human Rights as being fundamentally subsidiary, and that considerations 
made and measures taken by a legitimate authority in a democratic society 
should be given priority.109 
V. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE BURKINI BAN – A 
HYPOTHETICAL COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
The French ban on wearing burkinis has never been challenged in the 
European Court of Human Rights, neither before or after the decision of the 
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Conseil d’État.110  However, despite the absence of such challenge, this 
section will try to speculate on the position of the European Court towards 
the burkini ban in France through the examination of some of its decisions 
regarding the ban on wearing religious attires and symbols in different 
jurisdictions. 
A. Turkey 
Like France, Turkey does not adopt a neutral position towards 
religion, however, it advances a system of assertive secularism that resents 
the manifestation of religion in the public sphere and views the principle of 
secularism (laik) as a supra-constitutional value in modern and free civic 
societies, which should be guarded by all of the state's institutions, 
especially the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC).111  For instance, in 
1989, the TCC ruled that wearing headscarves in public universities 
violated the separation of religion and state.112  Further, in a decision 
delivered in 1991, the Court reaffirmed its view by holding that “in 
institutions of higher education, it is contrary to the principles of secularism 
and equality for the neck and hair to be covered with a veil or headscarf on 
grounds of religious conviction.”113 
Turkey's strong established secularism was tested in the landmark case 
of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey.114  The case originated in an application submitted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110. Stephanie Berry, A Red Line Even for the European Court of Human Rights?, OXFORD 
HUM. RTS. HUB (Sept. 7, 2016), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-burkini-ban-a-red-line-even-for-the-
european-court-of-human-rights/; see also Kern, supra note 89. 
111. The Preamble of the 1982 Turkish Constitution provides that “religious feelings shall 
absolutely not be involved in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of secularism.”  
Likewise, Article 2 of the Constitution reads,  
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular (laik) and social State based on 
the rule of law that is respectful of human rights in a spirit of social peace, 
national solidarity and justice, adheres to the nationalism of Atatürk and is 
underpinned by the fundamental principles set out in the Preamble. 
Hirschl, supra note 24, at 436; see also Anayasasi (Constitution), Article 2 (Turk.). 
112. The Turkish Constitutional Court found that  
Regardless of whether the Islamic headscarf is a precept of Islam, granting legal 
recognition to a religious symbol of that type in institutions of higher education 
was not compatible with the principle that State education must be neutral, as it 
would be liable to generate conflicts between students with differing religious 
convictions or belief. 
Yargitay (Sup. Ct.), E. 1989/12 (Turk.). 
113. Yargitay (Sup. Ct.), E. 1991/8 (Turk.). 
114. Leyla Sahı̇n v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 608 Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 (2005). 
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to the European Court of Human Rights by Leyla Şahin, a devoted Muslim 
Turkish student who wears Islamic hijab, challenging the decision of the 
Vice-Chancellor of the Istanbul University, which banned students with 
beards and those who wore an Islamic headscarf from attending lectures 
and written examinations.115 
Şahin argued that the decision of the Vice-Chancellor constituted an 
unjustified interference with her religious freedom and violated Articles 9 
and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—concerning the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the prohibition of 
discrimination.116  In delivering its decision, the Court emphasized that 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights “does not protect 
every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief,” before arguing that 
“pluralism,” “tolerance,” and “broadmindedness” are the core values of any 
democratic society, and that when the relationship between the state and the 
religion is at stake, the discretion of national authorities must be given 
special consideration.117  Consequently, according to the Court, there has 
been no violation of Articles 9 or 14 of the Convention and thus, the 
decision of the university's Vice-Chancellor must stand.118 
B. Italy 
Interestingly, the principle of secularism has never been mentioned 
anywhere in the Italian Constitution of 1948.119  However, this should not 
be construed to mean that the Italian Constitution adopts a strong 
establishment clause that advances for a religious state.120  In fact, the 
Italian Constitution avoided determining the relationship between state and 
religion in an explicit manner; instead it merely emphasized that 
discrimination among citizens based on religion must be prohibited,121 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115. Id.  
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 5. 
118. In 2008, urged by the necessity of preserving the secular character of the state, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court annulled a constitutional amendment presented by the moderately religious Justice 
and Development Party that effectively lifted the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in public 
institutions.  Id. at 5‒6. 
119. See generally Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
120. Id. 
121.  
All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without 
distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal and social 
conditions.  It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an 
economic and social nature which in fact limit the freedom and equality of 
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that the religion of any party or association should not be a cause for a 
special legislative, fiscal, or judicial measure or activity.122 
The Italian interpretation of the principle of secularism was questioned 
in 2005 in the case of Lautsi v. Italy.123  This case involved a claim filed by 
an atheist woman, who is a citizen of Finland and of Italy, in the Veneto 
Administrative Court, challenging the conduct of the board of an Italian 
public school in refusing to remove crucifixes from classrooms arguing that 
it violated the principle of secularism.124  However, the Court dismissed the 
claim holding that displaying crucifixes in State-school classrooms does not 
offend secularism.125 
The applicant, whose children attended public schools in Italy, 
appealed the decision to the ECHR arguing that displaying crucifixes in 
classrooms violated Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Protocol 1, Article 2 of the Convention respectively—regarding 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right of the parents to 
educate their children in institutions that are consistent with their 
philosophical convictions and religious beliefs.126  The Court agreed with 
the applicant’s claim holding that hanging crucifixes in State-school 
classrooms violates the principles of “neutrality” and “disestablishment.”127 
In 2011, the Italian government appealed the decision to the Grand 
Chamber of the ECHR.128  In advancing a clear compatible reasoning, the 
Court's Grand Chamber upheld the right of the government to display 
crucifixes in State-school classrooms.129  The Court argued that the 
presence of the crucifix in Italy's public schools is a result of the State's 
historical development by explaining that the crucifix is not only a religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
citizens, impede the full development of the human person and the effective 
participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organization of 
the country.  Art. 3 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
122. “The ecclesiastical character and the purpose of religion or worship of an association or 
institution may not be a cause for special legislative limitations, nor for special fiscal impositions in its 
constitution, juridical capacity and any form of activity.”  Art. 20 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
123. See generally Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). 
124. Id. at 3. 
125. The Court claimed that although the crucifix is a religious symbol, it became a symbol of 
Christianity in general not only Catholicism.  Thus, it represents a point of reference for other creeds as 
well.  Id. at 5. 
126. “No person shall be denied the right to education.  In the exercise of any functions which 
it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure 
such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”  Id. 
at 14, 18, 25; see also Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 2, Protocol 1. 
127. Hirschl, supra note 24, at 428‒29. 
128. Lautsi, supra note 123, at 16–18. 
129. Id. 
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symbol, but also a matter of tradition and identity in Italy, which falls 
within “the margin of appreciation of the respondent State.”130 
C. Switzerland 
In 2001, the ECHR ruled on the admissibility of wearing an Islamic 
headscarf in Swiss schools in the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland.131  In this 
case, the applicant, a primary school teacher who had converted to Islam, 
challenged the decision by the school's authority that banned her from 
wearing a headscarf while carrying out her professional duties.132  
Explaining that such conduct violates section 6 of the Public Education Act, 
which stipulates that “[T]he public education system shall ensure that the 
political and religious beliefs of pupils and parents are respected.”133 
The applicant appealed against that decision to the Geneva Cantonal 
Government, which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the applicant's 
Islamic headscarf was incompatible with the State’s school policy to not 
disturb “denominational neutrality,”134 and that the applicant's wearing of 
the headscarf should not be extended beyond the personal sphere.135  The 
applicant appealed this decision to the Swiss Federal Court, claiming that it 
violated Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and that the ban on wearing 
the headscarf interfered with “the inviolable core of freedom of religion.”136  
However, the Federal Court upheld the decision of the Geneva Cantonal 
Government, arguing that although the applicant demonstrated that she 
wears the headscarf, not for aesthetic reasons, but to show allegiance to a 
particular faith, “the wearing of a headscarf and loose-fitting clothes 
remains an outward manifestation which, as such, is not part of the 
inviolable core of freedom of religion.”137 
After exhausting all of the domestic appeals, the applicant filed a 
claim in the ECHR stating that the Swiss Court’s conduct, in upholding the 
ban on wearing the headscarf while teaching, constituted a breach of her 
freedom of religion protected by Article 9 of the European Convention on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130. Id. at 50. 
131. See generally Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
132. Id. at 1. 
133. Id. at 4. 
134. Id. at 2. 
135. Id. 
136. Dahlab, supra note 131, at 3. 
137. Id. 
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Human Rights.138  The Court decided the case on a clear admissibility test 
rejecting the applicant's claim for being ill-founded within the meaning of 
Article 35 § 3.139  According to the Court, the measures taken by the 
Geneva Cantonal Government and upheld by the Swiss Federal Court are 
reasonable and proportionate in protecting the rights and freedoms of 
others, and in promoting public order and public safety, and banning the 
applicant from wearing the headscarf while teaching is “necessary in a 
democratic society.”140 
VI. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE BURKINI BAN 
As mentioned before, the ECHR is yet to render its opinion on the 
French burkini ban.141  However, for the purpose of our argument, the 
hypothetical question that we should pose right now is:  if a legal claim is 
lodged with the Court, challenging the decision of the Conseil d’État which 
lifted the ban on wearing burkinis,142 how is the Court likely to respond? 
A careful examination of the Court’s previous comparative assessment 
regarding the legitimacy of displaying religious symbols and garbs in public 
reveals that there are some main principles settled by the Court that would 
govern its future determinations regarding how the conflict between 
secularism and the wearing of religious symbols and garbs is to be solved.  
Among these principles, three are of a paramount significance. 
First, the Court is of the opinion that in a democratic society, where 
secularism is thought to be linked to the identity of the state, the state's 
authorities are always in a better position to determine on a factual basis 
whether the wearing of religious symbols and attires in public violates the 
principle of secularism with a view to fostering better knowledge of the 
state's limits on rights and freedoms and evaluating local needs.143 
Second, the Court interpreted Article 8 (right to privacy and family 
life), Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion), and 
Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to have a mere subsidiary role in implementing the 
Convention’s mechanism, and that Article 9 of the Convention has a limited 
effect in that it does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion 
or belief.144 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138. Id. at 7. 
139. Id. at 13. 
140. Id. 
141. Berry, supra note 110. 
142. See Droits de l’Homme Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie, supra note 2. 
143. S.A.S, supra note 4, § 129. 
144. Id. § 113. 
465 Abdelaal 2017]  
	  
Third, the Court acknowledged that the ban imposed on wearing 
religious symbols and attires could be justified on the basis of security and 
safety concerns.145  Such concerns could be derived from the necessity of 
verifying the identity of any person if reasonable grounds are available, 
maintaining the requirements of living together and societal integration, or 
protecting public health.146 
In fact, the Court's declaration regarding the question of whether 
bringing specific religious symbol or attire in public violates the principle 
of secularism is a matter that falls within the margin of appreciation of the 
state.147  More precisely, by this declaration, the Court seems to delegate to 
the state authorities a great deal of discretionary power in interpreting 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in an attempt to 
justify their alleged measure restricting fundamental rights and freedoms.148 
Consequently, a careful reading of the three principles established by 
the Court in its decisions shows that the second and third principles merely 
serve the purpose of the first principle.  Specifically, when the Court 
declares that articles of the Convention concerning the right to privacy and 
family life, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and 
the right to freedom of expression are of a subsidiary role, it implicitly 
acknowledges the right of the respondent state to bypass these rights for 
some other concerns.149 
Further, when the Court brings security and public safety concerns to 
light, it consolidates the discretion of the respondent state to determine how 
to guard the principle of secularism.150  In other words, because it is an 
international court, the ECHR does not have full access to information and 
resources that are available to national authorities to determine how a threat 
to the security and safety of the state would be better administered.151 
That being said, if the French ban on the burkini would have been 
challenged, or if the decision of the Conseil d’État which lifted the ban is 
challenged before the ECHR, it is likely that the Court would respond by 
upholding the ban or by reversing the Conseil d’État's decision, reinstating 
the ban.152  This would be the favored outcome, taking into account the 
Court's methodology in giving preference to the discretion of the state on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145. Id. § 139. 
146. Id. 
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151. Id. 
152. See generally Berry, supra note 110. 
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how secularism is to be protected in a democratic society.153  Further, this 
outcome is reinforced by the security concerns linked to Islamic extremism, 
cited by the mayor of Cannes in banning the burkini amid the terrorist 
attacks on French territory in 2016, and by the allegation of the mayor of 
the town of Villeneuve-Loubet, that wearing the burkini is incompatible 
with France's secular character since the Court's legal precedents advance a 
clear adherence to the appreciation of the state when the matter is related to 
security concerns and how secularism is better functioned.154 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Let me restate the paradox of the ban on wearing religious symbols 
and attires.  On one hand, the promise of secularism advances banning 
religious features, including wearing religious symbols and attires in 
public.155  Yet, on the other hand, this promise actually undermines some 
fundamental rights and freedoms such as, right to privacy and freedom of 
religion, thought, and conscience.156  Secularism should not be construed 
widely to mean atheism, where religion is not allowed to be practiced, and 
is always associated with social and political retardation.157  However, 
secularism introduces a model where people are not obligated to practice 
religion, but they are also not obligated to not practice religion.158 
In this context, it is worth mentioning that there is a difference 
between a secular state and a secular society.  This differentiation is evident 
in France where the policy of Laïcité or secularism is declared as a supra-
constitutional value, which requires the separation of the state and the 
church, and presumes the issuance of a political decision that is free from 
the influence of religion.159  On the other hand, a claim that the French 
society can be rendered as a pure secular one is unlikely to prevail simply 
because heavy bearded men, women wearing crucifixes, hijab, and niqab, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153. See generally S.A.S, supra note 4. 
154. Harry Zahn, French Mayor of Cannes Bans ‘Burkini’ Swimwear, PBS (Aug. 12, 2016, 
3:41 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/french-mayor-cannes-bans-burkini-swimwear/; see 
also Kern, supra note 89. 
155. See generally S.A.S, supra note 4; Claire Saas, Muslim Headscarf and Secularism in 
France, 3 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 453, 453 (2001). 
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157. Hirschl, supra note 10, at 423; see also Saas, supra note 155.  
158. Saas, supra note 155, at 455. 
159. 1958 CONST. art. 2 (Fr.). 
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and people reading the Qur'an, Bible, and Torah can easily be spotted in the 
French streets and in public transportations.160 
Despite its constitutional quality, the French Laïcité policy should not 
be interpreted, as the previous cases may recommend, as an instrument to 
curb Islamic social incursion, unless Islam is thought to constitute a security 
threat.161  In France, authorities often raise the argument that protecting the 
requirements of secularism is always used as a warrant to restrict or even 
ban wearing religious symbols and attires, like the case of the Islamic hijab 
and burqa, instead of raising security concerns which are likely to be the 
motive behind the ban after all.162  However, in the case of the burkini ban, 
urged by the 2016 terrorist attacks, French authorities did not find any 
shortcoming in justifying the ban on the ground that wearing the burkini 
consolidates for Islamic extremism.163 
In fact, to the extent that strong constitutional religious establishment 
clauses, which require the state to formally endorse a certain religion to its 
state religion, and requires that the entire legal and social system should be 
inherently committed to the sacred texts and authority of a certain religion, 
poses a great threat to fundamental rights and freedoms—like in the cases 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia—164 secularism could pose the same threat as 
well.  In countries with an extreme religious ideology, such as Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, a western woman is likely to construe the ban on wearing a 
bikini in public pools and beaches as an infringement to her fundamental 
rights and freedoms.  Equally, extreme secularism could result in a blatant 
infringement to fundamental rights and freedoms. 
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164. Article 1 of the Saudi Basic Law (1993) reads:  “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a 
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